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Limitation of Liability and the Direct Action Statute: A
Troubled Marriage
Chester D. Hooper*
Ironically, direct action statutes' seem to have bestowed on underwriters and
removed from the legislatures and the courts much of the authority to determine
who may limit the underwriter's liability and the amount of the limitation. This
irony is due to the courts' eagerness to apply the direct action remedy as widely
as possible to resolve limitation proceedings as they, rather than Congress, wish
to resolve them. This eagerness has been bound only by the four corners of the
insurance contract. Insurers have thus been left to set the limits in the terms of
their insurance contracts.
This ironic position seems to have evolved from a desire to prevent an
insurer from denying an injured person the ability to collect the proceeds of an
insurance policy which might have been bought for the injured person's benefit.
This desire is reasonable in an automobile accident setting. A state may have
required a motorist to purchase insurance to pay for injuries the motorist may
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1. While a number of states have enacted direct action statutes, more maritime cases arise under
Louisiana's direct action statute than' other states' enactments. Louisiana's direct action statute
provides in relevant part:
B. (1) The injured person or his or her survivors or heirs.., at their option, shall have
a right of direct action against the insurer within the terms and limits of the policy; and,
such action may be brought against the insurer alone, or against both the insured and
insurer jointly and in solido ....
(2) This right of direct actioq shall exist ... whether or not such policy contains a
provision forbidding such direct action, provided the accident or injury occurred within
the state of Louisiana. Nothing contained in'this Section shall be construed to affect the
provisions of the policy or contract if such provisions are not in violation of the laws of
this tate.
C. It is the intent of this Section that any action brought under the provisions of this
Section shall be subject to all of the lawful conditions of the policy or contract and the
defenses which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the insured,
provided the terms and conditions of such policy or contract are not in violation of the
laws of this state.
D. It is also the intent of this Section that all liability policies within their terms and
limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons and their survivors or heirs to
whom the insured is liable; and, that it is the purpose of all liability policies to give
protection and coverage to all insureds ... for any legal liability said insured may have
as or for a tortfeasor within the terms and limits of said policy.
La. R.S. 22:655 (1977 & Supp. 1994).
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inflict on others. If the motorist does injure someone, the injured person should
not be denied compensation simply because he or she could not find and serve
process on the insured motorist. The victim should be able to sue the insurer
directly.
The direct action theory does not make as much sense in an admiralty
context, particularly when it is used to circumvent limitation of liability.2 The
marine insurance authority, Leslie J. Buglass, has noted:
Several states in the United States have direct action statutes which
permit claims to be pursued directly against underwriters for damages
recoverable against a shipowner, even though such damages may exceed
that shipowner's limitation fund. The startling philosophy (from
underwriters' viewpoint) behind such statutes is that liability insurance
is for the benefit of the injured party rather than for the protection of
the assured.3
A glimpse of some rationale used in attempts to interpret the limitation issue
and the direct action issue may show how these issues have become intertwined
and, at times, almost strangled each other. The United States Supreme Court has
said:
We are not only satisfied that the law does not compel the
shipowner to surrender his insurance in order to have the benefit of
limited liability, but that a contrary result would defeat the principal
object of the law. That object was to enable merchants to invest money
in ships without subjecting them to an indefinite hazard of losing their
whole property by the negligence or misconduct of the master or crew,
but only subjecting them to the loss of their investment. Now to
construe the law in such a manner as to prevent the merchant from
2. The original Limitation of Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 181-188 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993) (hereinafter the Limitation Act), enacted in 1851, "provides a procedure in admiralty
to enjoin all pending suits and to compel them to be filed in a special limitation proceeding so that
liability may be determined and limited to the value of the shipowner's vessel and freight pending."
The idea's origin can be traced back to the medieval sea codes. "Its justification was that running
a ship was an inherently risky business, a fact well known to all parties to a marine venture, and the
imposition of full and one-sided liability on a shipowner would discourage maritime commerce." 2
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law § 15, at 298-99 (1987).
The Limitation Act provides in relevant part:
The liability of the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign, for any
embezzlement, loss, or destruction by any person of any property, goods, or merchandise
shipped or put on board of such vessel, or for any loss, damage, or injury by collision,
or for any act, matter, or thing, loss, damage, or forfeiture, done, occasioned, or incurred,
without the privity or knowledge of such owner or owners, shall not ... exceed the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending.
46 U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (1988).
3. Leslie J. Buglass, Marine Insurance and General Average in the United States 434 (3d ed.
1991).
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contracting with an insurance company for indemnity against the loss
of his investment is contrary to the spirit of commercial jurisprudence.
Why should he not be allowed to purchase such an indemnity? Is it
against public policy? That cannot be, for public policy would equally
condemn all insurance by which a man provides indemnity for himself
against the risks of fire, losses at sea, and other casualties. To hold that
this cannot be done tends to discourage those who might otherwise be
willing to invest their money in the shipping business. It would
virtually and in effect bring back the law to the English rule, by which
the owner is made liable for the value of the ship before collision-the
very thing which, in all our decisions on the subject, we have held it
was the intention of Congress to avoid by adopting the maritime rule.
That this would be the result is evident, because all shipowners insure
the greater part of their interest in the ship, and by losing their
insurance they would lose the value of their ship in every case. No
form of agreement could be framed by which they could protect
themselves. This is a result entirely foreign to the spirit of our
legislation.4
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Olympic Towing Corp.
v. Nebel Towing Co.5 said:
Underlying this principle [of direct action] is the public policy of
Louisiana which proclaims that liability insurance-including purported
indemnity insurance-is issued primarily for the protection of the public
rather than the insured. We think it clear, therefore, that the clause
relied upon here does not preclude a direct action.
The dissenting opinion in Nebel Towing Co. quoted the very language of
Louisiana's direct action statute:
It is also the intent of this section that all liability policies within
their terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons
* * * and that it is the purpose of all liability policies to give protection
and coverage to all insureds * * * for any legal liability said insured
may have as or for a tort-feasor within the terms and limits of said
policy.6
4. Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468, 504-05, 6 S. Ct. 1150, 1163 (1886)
[hereinafter City of Norwich].
5. 419 F.2d 230, 237, 1969 A.M.C. 1571, 1580 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989, 90
S. Ct. 1120 (1970), overruled by Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1296, 1986
A.M.C. 1471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986).
6. Id. at 241 (Brown, C.J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing) (quoting the Louisiana direct
action statute).
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The same dissenting opinion went on to state:
As long as the Direct Action Statute subjects the insurer to no
greater liability than the assured would have, it fulfills the Louisiana
policy of public protection and avoids troublesome questions of conflict
between state and federal maritime law. The Court's reading rewrites
the contract, imposes liability beyond that of the assured and ignores
substantive limitations on liability under maritime principles. The
essential uniformity of the admiralty is at an end when for a like
casualty across the line in Texas the "liability" of the shipowner is
less-by the amount of total damages and the policy limits-than it is
in Louisiana.7
Another Fifth Circuit dissenting opinion has said:
Although the trial court, having been Nebel-awed, presumably
thought that anything which forbade 100% recovery was somehow
outlawed, it is plain that application of any such approach would
produce absurd results which even the most potent Nebelizer would
protest.'
The disputes concerning limitation and direct action statutes have not
centered on the issue one might anticipate: whether an insurance company or
even a protection and indemnity club might be sued directly. That aspect
appears to have been settled.9 Even protection and indemnity clubs may be sued
directly despite the indemnity nature of the coverage." The ability to sue even
an indemnity insurer should satisfy the theory that insurance exists to protect
7. Id. at 246 (Brown, C.J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing).
8. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1984) (Brown,
C.J., dissenting in part), vacated en banc, 783 F.2d 1296, 1986 A.M.C. 1471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 821, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986).
9. See Grubbs v. Gulf Int'l Marine, Inc., 625 So. 2d 495 (La. 1993). Crown Zellerbach Corp.
quoted the following explanation from Hidalgo v. Dupuy, 122 So. 2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960),
which in turn quoted Nebel Towing Co.: "The statute simply voids any policy clause which
conditions the right of the injured person to enforce against the insurer its contractual obligation to
pay the insured's debt upon, as prerequisite, the obtaining by the injured person of a judgment against
the insured." Crown Zellerbach Corp., 783 F.2d at 1299, 1986 A.M.C. at 1476 (quoting Hidalgo,
122 So. 2d at 644-45).
10. Typical protection and indemnity club rules provide:
All insurance afforded by the Association is by way of indemnity ....
If any Member shall incur liabilities, costs or expenses for which he is insured, he shall
be entitled to recovery from the Association out of the funds ... PROVIDED that actual
payment (out of monies belonging to him absolutely and not by way of loan or otherwise)
by the Member of the full amount of such liabilities, costs and expenses shall be a
condition precedent to his right of recovery ....
The London Steam-Ship Owners' Mutual Insurance Association, R. 1.1, 3.1 and 3.1.1.
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injured persons. The direct action has, however, been used to obtain even more
for the injured person than the law would require the insured to pay.
A return to the basic, straightforward explanation offered by Mr. Justice
Bradley in City of Norwich" would help the "marriage" between direct action
statutes and limitation. That case involved a collision on Long Island Sound
between the steamboat City of Norwich and the schooner General S. Van Vilet.
The owners of the steamboat filed a limitation petition. The issue discussed by
the court and relevant to this article was whether insurance proceeds should be
added to the limitation fund. The Supreme Court first reviewed the laws of the
United States, England, Prussia, the German states, and France. After that
review, the Court held insurance proceeds should not be added to the limitation
fund. 2 The rationale used by the Court in that case should help resolve
problems that are present today. 3
The Court asked whether insurance should constitute a part of that interest
and decided it should not:
This view is corroborated by reference to a rule of law which we
suppose to be perfectly well settled, namely, that the insurance which
a person has on property is not an interest in the property itself, but is
a collateral contract, personal to the insured, guaranteeing him against
loss of the property by fire or other specified casualty, but not confer-
ring upon him any interest in the property. That interest he has already,
by virtue of his ownership. If it were not for a rule of public policy
against wagers, requiring insurance to be for indemnity merely, he could
just as well take out insurance on another's property as on his own, and
it is manifest that this would give him no interest in the property. 4
The Court was faced, in 1886, with the same emotional issues often faced
today. The claimants stressed the hardship inflicted upon them. They argued it
would be unjust to allow the shipowner to be entirely indemnified (by insurance)
for the loss of his vessel while the parties who suffered loss due to the fault of
the shipowner's employees would not be indemnified. The Supreme Court's
answer to that argument was refreshing. It explained simply that the injured
parties could have bought insurance themselves which would have indemnified
them. The Court's rationale is quite clear and self-explanatory:
It is not an irrelevant consideration in this regard, that the owner of
the property is under no obligation to have it insured. It is purely a
11. 118 U.S. 468, 6 S. Ct. 1150 (1886).
12. Id. at 493-502, 6 S. Ct. at 1156-61.
13. The Court first looked to the Limitation Act, which was then only 35 years old. The Court
noted: "The statute, section 4283, declares that the liability of the owner shall not exceed the amount
or value of his interest in the vessel and her freight .... " Id. at 493, 6 S. Ct. at 1157. See also
supra note 2.
14. City of Norwich, 118 U.S. at 494, 6 S. Ct. at 1157.
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matter of his own option. And being so, it would seem to be only fair
and right, and a logical consequence, that if he chooses to insure, he
should have the benefit of the insurance. He does not take the price of
insurance from the thing insured, but takes it out of the general mass of
his estate, to which his general creditors have a right to look for the
satisfaction of their claims. They are the creditors who have the best
right to the insurance.
Stress is laid upon the hardship of the case. It is said to be unjust
that the shipowner should be entirely indemnified for the loss of his
vessel, and that the parties who have suffered loss from the collision by
the fault of his employees should get nothing for their indemnity. This
mode of contrasting the condition of the parties is fallacious. If the
shipowner is indemnified against loss, it is because he has seen fit to
provide himself with insurance. The parties suffering loss from the
collision could, if they chose, protect themselves in the same way. In
fact, they generally do so; and when they do, it becomes a question
between their insurers and the shipowner whether they or he shall have
the benefit of his insurance. His insurers have to pay his loss. Why
should not the insurers of the other parties pay their loss? The truth
is, that the whole question, after all, comes back to this: Whether a
limited liability of shipowners is consonant to public policy or not.
Congress has declared that it is, and they, and not we, are the judges of
that question.' s
While the City of Norwich Court quite clearly held that insurance proceeds
should not be part of, and thus should not increase the limitation fund, 16 the
issue became somewhat muddled in a 4-1-4 decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.7 In that case, the
tugboat Jane Smith, while attempting to pass under a bridge over the Atchafalaya
River in Louisiana, collided with a concrete pier and capsized. The owner and
the charterer of the Jane Smith filed consolidated petitions to limit their
liabilities. Representatives of the five deceased seamen brought, in the same
federal district court, actions against the owner of the bridge and the liability
underwriters of the owner and charterer of the Jane Smith. They argued they
had the right to bring a direct action against the underwriter in addition to and
separate from the limitation proceeding. In other words, they wished to recover
from the owner and charterer of the Jane Smith, in the limitation proceeding, the
value of the Jane Smith at the end of her voyage plus freight pending, and from
15. Id. at 495, 6 S. Ct. at 1157-58 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 504, 6 S. Ct. at 1163.
17. 347 U.S. 409, 74 S. Ct. 608, 1954 A.M.C. 837 (1954) [hereinafter Jane Smith].
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the underwriter directly the balance of their damages. These damages, they
argued, should be limited only by the amount of the insurance policy.'
One can predict a response to this argument-limit the amount of insurance
coverage to the amount of the insured's limitation fund and argue that the
plaintiff could recover only one limitation fund. The district court granted a
motion for summary judgment dismissing the suit against the underwriters on the
rationale, inter alia, that allowing a direct action against the underwriters would
"contravene the essential purpose expressed by the Act of Congress in a field
already covered by [the Limitation] Act."'9 The Fifth Circuit reversed on the
theory that the district court had read the Louisiana direct action statute too
restrictively. The appellate court reasoned that the statute was nothing more than
a permissible regulation of insurance and was not in conflict with any substantive
admiralty law.20
In the United States Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, announcing the
judgment of the Court and joined by Mr. Justice Reed, Mr. Justice Jackson, and
Mr. Justice Burton, would have reversed the judgment of the Fifth Circuit and
reinstated the district court opinion dismissing the direct action. They reasoned
that the effect of the direct action would disturb the limitation proceeding. They
viewed it as "a disturbing intrusion by a State on the harmony and uniformity of
one aspect of maritime law."'"
18. Id at 409-11, 74 S. Ct. at 608-09, 1954 A.M.C. at 838-40.
19. Cushing v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 99 F. Supp. 681, 684, 1951 A.M.C. 1878, 1883 (E.D. La.
1951).
20. Cushing v. Maryland Casualty Co., 198 F.2d 536, 538-39, 1952 A.M.C. 1803, 1806-08 (5th
Cir. 1952).
21. Jane Smith, 347 U.S. at 422, 74 S. Ct. at 615, 1954 A.M.C. at 847. The rationale expressed
by these Justices reads as follows:
Of course, liability underwriters are not entitled to "limitation of liability" as that phrase
is used as a term of art in admiralty. To state the issue in these terms is to misconceive
it. The question is whether the Court is to disregard the effect of a direct action on the
federal proceedings. The Louisiana statute, as applied to authorize suits against the
insurers of shipowners and charterers who have instituted limitation proceedings, is a
disturbing intrusion by a State on the harmony and uniformity of one aspect of maritime
law. It is accentuated by the fact that the federal law involved is not a more or less ill
defined area of maritime common law, incursion upon which need not be here considered,
but an Act of Congress, well-defined and consciously designed, with detailed rules for its
execution established by this Court.
"If the courts having the execution of [the Limitation Act] administer it in a spirit of
fairness, with the view of giving to ship owners the full benefit of the immunities intended
to be secured by it, the encouragement it will afford to commercial operations (as before
stated) will be of the last importance: but if it is administered with a tight and grudging
hand, construing every clause most unfavorably against the ship owner, and allowing as
little as possible to operate in his favor, the law will hardly be worth the trouble of its
enactment. Its value and efficiency will also be greatly diminished, if not entirely
destroyed, by allowing its administration to be hampered and interfered with by various
and conflicting jurisdictions."
1995]
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Four Justices held the contrary view. Mr. Justice Black, Chief Justice
Warren, Mr. Justice Douglas, and Mr. Justice Minton did not think insurance
companies should be beneficiaries of the Limitation Act, which they considered
a "shipowners' relief act.""2 They viewed the application of the direct action
statute in that case as a remedy Louisiana had provided for wrongful death due
to a maritime tort. Somewhat emotional arguments stated that "[alt one time
insurance companies were commonly able to avoid payment of a single dollar
on their policies whenever the insured was insolvent and therefore judgment-
proof."23 The Justices thought that "unless Congress has specifically forbidden
states to protect seamen [through a direct action system], Louisiana's statute is
valid and should be enforced." 24
The 4-4 tie was broken by Mr. Justice Clark. His position was characterized
by Mr. Justice Frankfurter as follows:
[T]he direct action suits should not be permitted to impair the ship
owner's and charterer's right to indemnification, but ... the District
Court [should be allowed] to adjudicate the liability of the [vessel
owner] to the [plaintiffs] after the limitation proceeding has run its
course.
25
Mr. Justice Clark agreed with the holding in City of Norwich-that "the
owner of the ship has the same right to protect his investment in the ship by
insurance against damage claims ... as he has to protect his investment from
damage to the ship itself."'26 He did not consider this view to benefit the
shipowner at the expense of the families of the deceased seamen. He realized
that, had the owner not purchased liability insurance, the claimants could not
have recovered under any condition more than the value of the damaged vessel
at the end of the voyage if the owner had no privity or knowledge of the cause
of the collision.27
Jane Smith did allow a direct action against the underwriters, but required
the limitation proceeding to be completed before the direct action could be heard.
As was later learned, if the insurance policy were worded so that the insurance
coverage would be exhausted by payment of the limitation amount, nothing
would be left to be paid in the direct action. In this way, the direct action has
allowed the underwriter, rather than the legislature, to determine the amount of
compensation to be received by plaintiffs.
Id. at 421-22, 74 S. Ct. at 615, 1954 A.M.C. at 847-48 (quoting Providence & N.Y.S.S. Co. v. Hill
Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 588-89, 3 S. Ct. 379, 386 (1883)).
22. Id. at 427, 74 S. Ct. at 620, 1954 A.M.C. at 851 (Black, J., dissenting).
23. Id. at 431, 74 S. Ct. at 620, 1954 A.M.C. at 854 (Black, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 432, 74 S. Ct. at 620, 1954 A.M.C. at 855 (Black, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 422-23, 74 S. Ct. at 615, 1954 A.M.C. at 848.
26. Id. at 424, 74 S. Ct. at 616, 1954 A.M.C. at 849 (Clark, J., concurring).
27. Id. (Clark, J., concurring).
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The development of the relationship between the Limitation Act and direct
action statutes continued to take place predominantly in the Fifth Circuit. The late
Judge John R. Brown, former Chief Judge of the Fifth Circuit, has had a very great
effect on the relationship, if any, between the Limitation Act and Louisiana's direct
action statute.
Ex parte Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co.2" was decided some nine years
after the Supreme Court's Jane Smith decision. Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance
Co. came before the Fifth Circuit because of what Judge Brown euphemistically
called the "rivalry, 29 between two district courts within the Fifth Circuit. The
matter arose out of a collision on the Mississippi River between a tanker and two
adrift barges which had allegedly been inadequately secured by the owner of the
servicing tug. The owner of the tug filed a petition for limitation of liability in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. Subsequently, the
tanker interests filed suit under Louisiana's direct action statute in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against the tug's underwriters.
The tug's limitation proceeding in the Southern District of Texas precluded the
tanker interests from filing suit against the tug or her owner, but did not preclude
the tanker interests from filing suit against the tug's underwriters. The tanker
interests petitioned the Fifth Circuit for writ of mandamus against the Texas judge
before whom the tug's limitation of liability proceeding was pending. The petition
asked that the judge be required to transfer the tug's limitation proceeding to the
Eastern District of Louisiana where it could be consolidated with the tanker's
proceeding against the tug's underwriters. The Fifth Circuit denied the petition.
The tug next petitioned the Fifth Circuit for writ of mandamus or prohibition
to prevent litigation from proceeding in the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Fifth
Circuit took "a practical view." 3' Judge Brown reasoned that the denial of the
petition to transfer the limitation proceeding from Texas to Louisiana meant the
Texas proceeding should go forward. Judge Brown noted that the Texas
proceeding involved the same facts as the Louisiana suit.32 Further noting that
"the direct action insurer stands as a party-litigant in exactly the same shoes as the
assured,33 Judge Brown stayed the Louisiana suit against the underwriters of the
tug and her owners and operators until the limitation proceeding in Texas was
concluded. 34 In doing so, however, Judge Brown did not decide whether the tug's
underwriters were liable for plaintiff's damages that exceeded the limitation fund.
Judge Brown wrote:
We ought not to muddy up those waters by attempting to divine what
the Supreme Court might now say it might have meant by its 4-1-4
28. 322 F.2d 113, 1964 A.M.C. 308 (5th Cir. 1963).
29. Id. at 114, 1964 A.M.C. at 309.
30. In re Humble Oil & Refining Co., 306 F.2d 567, 1964 A.M.C. 321 (5th Cir. 1962).
31. Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 322 F.2d at 116, 1964 A.M.C. at 312.
32. Id., 1964 A.M.C. at 313.
33. Id
34. d at 117, 1964 A.M.C. at 314.
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decision [in Jane Smith] until such time as it becomes certain that the
question is really presented.35
In In re Independent Towing Co.,36 a limitation of liability proceeding, the
district court held the Louisiana direct action statute deprived insurers of the
insured's personal defenses. The court reasoned that limitation of liability was
"personal" to shipowners and, therefore, was not available to their insurers.37 It
denied assertion of limitation of liability by the shipowner's liability insurer. Of
course, the district court struggled with the concerns expressed in Jane Smith and
Tokio Marine & Fire Insurance Co. While admitting that certain procedural
problems could arise,38 the court nevertheless forged ahead and denied insurers
the benefit of limitation of liability.
The personal defense theory was subsequently endorsed in Torres v. Interstate
Fire & Casualty Co. 39 In that case, the United States District Court for the
District of Puerto Rico followed Independent Towing Co. It denied the insurer the
opportunity to rely on limitation of liability, reasoning that Puerto Rico should give
the same construction to its direct action statute4° as Louisiana courts gave to
Louisiana's statute because the Puerto Rico statute was modeled after
Louisiana's.
41
The personal defense theory then went before the Fifth Circuit and withstood
the challenge of Judge Brown. The issue in Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel
Towing Co. 42 was the very issue which had not been decided in Tokio Marine &
Fire Insurance Co.
The underlying facts were simple. While attempting to avoid collision with
Nebel's tug, Olympic's tug struck an underwater object and sank. Olympic brought
suit against Nebel and, pursuant to the Louisiana direct action statute, Nebel's
insurer. Nebel thereafter petitioned for limitation of liability under the Limitation
Act. The district court held Nebel was entitled to limit its liability, but its insurer
was not. It reasoned that the Limitation Act was a personal defense available only
to the shipowner.43
On appeal, Nebel's insurer made numerous arguments, 44 all of which the
Fifth Circuit rejected. First, the insurer argued Louisiana's direct action statute was
35. Id. at 116, 1964 A.M.C. at 313.
36. 242 F. Supp. 950, 1965 A.M.C. 818 (E.D. La. 1965).
37. Id. at 954, 1965 A.M.C. at 824.
38. Id. at 956 n.13, 1965 A.M.C. at 827 n.13.
39. 275 F. Supp. 784 (D.P.R. 1967).
40. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, §§ 2001-2004 (1977 & Supp. 1994).
41. Torres, 275 F. Supp. at 789.
42. 419 F.2d 230, 1969 A.M.C. 1571 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989, 90 S. Ct. 1120
(1970), overruled by Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1296, 1986 A.M.C.
1471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986).
43. Id. at 231-32, 1969 A.M.C. at 1572.
44. Among the arguments were two technical arguments related to jurisdiction and concursus of
claims in admiralty. These arguments, both dismissed, will not be addressed in this article.
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in conflict with the Limitation Act and, therefore, should fall before paramount
federal law. The Fifth Circuit referred to Jane Smith and noted that the United
States Supreme Court had not invalidated Louisiana's direct action statute.45
Second, the insurer argued the shipowner would be deprived of the benefit of
its insurance if funds were exhausted in direct action suits in other fora, especially
state fora, before the conclusion of its limitation proceeding. The Fifth Circuit
noted that the federal court sitting in admiralty had "ample injunctive power for the
purpose of insuring the orderly and effective operation of the Limitation Act."
46
Third, the insurer contended that denying insurers the benefit of limitation of
liability would result in higher premiums to shipowners and would undermine the
purpose of the Limitation Act. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument noting,
inter alia, that spreading losses through higher premiums would be perfectly
compatible with the Limitation Act because the benefit of the full recovery is often
retained within the maritime industry, and because the Limitation Act was intended
to limit the amount of premiums paid by shipowners on insurance.47
Fourth, the insurer argued marine insurance was not subject to Louisiana's
direct action statute. The Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument, noting it had
already decided this issue.
48
Fifth, the insurer argued the nature of a protection and indemnity policy did not
permit a direct action. The argument was founded on the indemnity, or the pay-to-
be-paid, nature of shipowners' protection and indemnity coverage. The Fifth
Circuit rejected that argument, which the court said was contrary to the underlying
public policy of Louisiana-liability insurance is issued primarily for the protection
of the public rather than the insured.49 '
Finally, the insurer argued the right to limit liability is not a "personal defense"
under Louisiana law and, therefore, should be available to the insurer. The Fifth
Circuit explained that a "personal" defense attaches to the status because the law
grants it to all members of a chosen class as a matter of public policy. The court
noted the Limitation Act "was in no way intended to benefit the insurance
industry."50
After the Fifth Circuit rendered its decision, the appellants petitioned for
rehearing. The petition was denied, but Judge Brown wrote a forceful dissenting
opinion. Judge Brown argued the Louisiana direct action statute had been
misconstrued. He argued the statute was not intended to create a new liability
against the insurer, but "was intended merely to afford a direct, non-circuitous
means of satisfaction of a claim judicially determined to be owing by the assured
and which is within the limits and terms of the coverage afforded by the insurance
45. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d at 234, 1969 A.M.C. at 1575-76.
46. Id., 1969 A.M.C. at 1576-77.
47. Id., 1969 A.M.C. at 1578.
48. Id. at 236, 1969 A.M.C. at 1578-79.
49. Id. at 237, 1969 A.M.C. at 1579-80.
50. Id. at 238, 1969 A.M.C. at 1580-82.
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policy."'" His view, Judge Brown argued, was founded and supported by the very
language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:655, which at that time provided in part:
It is also the intent of this section that all liability policies within their
terms and limits are executed for the benefit of all injured persons... and
that it is the purpose of all liability policies to give protection and
coverage to all insureds ... for any legal liability said insured may have
as or for a tort-feasor within the terms and limits of said policy.
Judge Brown further opined that treating the shipowner's right to limit his
liability as a personal defense under Louisiana law was "completely wrong."52 He
argued the right to limit liability was not one which inheres in the "person" of the
shipowner and distinguished it from other personal defenses. He argued limitation
was available not to all shipowners under any circumstances but "to a shipowner
of a specific vessel under some circumstances."53 Judge Brown's major concern
was the effect the Louisiana treatment of limitation of liability would have on the
uniformity of the admiralty principles.
Nebel Towing Co. came two years after a Fifth Circuit panel, which included
Judge Brown, decided Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co. 4 Perhaps
Judge Brown, convinced Alcoa Steamship Co. represented the correct direction in
which the law should move to preserve uniformity in admiralty, feared Nebel
Towing Co. would play havoc.
Alcoa Steamship Co. discussed a ship repair contract and the contractor's
liability insurance. The S.S. Alcoa Corsair underwent repair in New Orleans
provided by C. Ferran & Co. Ferran carried liability insurance, limited to
$300,000; that limit was a term of the repair contract. The shipowner brought suit
against the repair contractor on a negligence theory and, under Louisiana's direct
action statute, against the contractor's liability insurance carrier for damages in
excess of the $300,000 policy limit."
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the contractor and
its insurer were liable, but limited their liability to the $300,000 policy limit. While
acknowledging that a "personal defense" would not have been available to the
insurer, the Fifth Circuit explained that a "limitation of liability agreed to by parties
in relatively equal bargaining positions does not fall into that category [of personal
defenses]. 56
Following Alcoa Steamship Co., Judge Brown may have thought courts
would stay the course and preserve uniformity in admiralty. Thus, the majority
51. Id. at 240 (Brown, C.J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing).
52. Id. at 243 (Brown, C.J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing).
53. Id. (Brown, C.J., dissenting from a denial of rehearing).
54. 383 F.2d 46, 1967 A.M.C. 2578 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 836, 89 S. Ct. 111
(1968). The district court decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit is located at Alcoa S.S Co. v.
Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823, 1966 A.M.C. 1029 (E.D. La. 1966).
55. Alcoa S.S. Co., 383 F.2d at 48-49, 1967 A.M.C. at 2579-80.
56. Id. at 56, 1967 A.M.C. at 2592.
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opinion in Nebel Towing Co. was, to Judge Brown, "completely wrong." The
opportunity to correct the "wrong" came in 1984, fifteen years after Nebel
Towing Co. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc.,5 was argued
before a panel of three Fifth Circuit judges including Judge Brown. The case
concerned a collision by a tug-barge against a water intake structure on the
Mississippi River above Baton Rouge, Louisiana, in heavy fog and rain. Suit
was filed by the owner of the water intake structure against the tug owner and
its protection and indemnity (P & I) insurers. The tug owner relied on the
Limitation Act, and the P & I insurers relied on their policy limit. The district
court limited the tug owner's liability, but held the P & I insurers liable for
nearly $2 million in excess of the tug owner's limitation, despite the terms of the
P & I insurance contract which limited the dollar amount of the coverage to the
amount to which the insured could limit his liability.5"
"Unable to find any valid distinction,"59 the majority of the panel felt
compelled to follow Nebel Towing Co. The majority said the insurer could not,
under Nebel Towing Co., reduce its liability solely on the basis of the ship-
owner's statutory right to limit his liability. It viewed the insurer's argument as
merely an "indirect" attempt to bring about the same result the Nebel Towing Co.
court had expressly denied. The majority affirmed the district court's decision;
the insurers had to pay more than $2 million over and above the fixed liability
under the insurance policy.
Judge Brown dissented. He argued in his thorough dissent that "there must
be a legal liability on part of the assured for the insurer to have a direct action
liability."'  He reasoned that a provision of the policy which limited the
insurer's liability was a separate issue to be distinguished from the statutory right
Nebel Towing Co. addressed; a policy defense, as opposed to a statutory defense,
could not be a personal defense.6"
An application for rehearing en banc was made and the Fifth Circuit granted
the request. In the en banc hearing,62 the Fifth Circuit not only reversed the
district court's decision, but also overruled Nebel Towing Co. Judge Brown
wrote for the court and adopted, in large part, his dissenting opinion from Crown
Zellerbach Corp. L
Judge Brown first reviewed the Nebel Towing Co. decision. He agreed the
term of the P&I insurance policy which limited coverage to the sums the insured
57. 745 F.2d 995, 1986 A.M.C. 305 (5th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach Corp. 1],
vacated en banc, 783 F.2d 1296, 1986 A.M.C. 1471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821, 107 S.
Ct. 87 (1986).
58. Id. at 997, 1985 A.M.C. at 306-07.
59. Id. at 998, 1985 A.M.C. at 309.
60. Id. at 1000, 1985 A.M.C. at 313 (Brown, C.J., dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 1002-05, 1985 A.M.C. at 319-21 (Brown, C.J., dissenting in part).
62. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1296, 1986 A.M.C. 1471 (5th Cir.)
(en banc) [hereinafter Crown Zellerbach Corp. I1], cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986).
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had paid ran afoul of the Louisiana direct action statute.63 But he disagreed
with Nebel Towing Co.'s dictum that indicated limitation of liability was a
defense personal to the shipowner and not available to the insurer.6
Judge Brown made a simple and clear distinction between the underwriter's
argument in Nebel Towing Co. and the underwriter's argument in the case before
the court. In Nebel Towing Co., the underwriter claimed it had a right to the
statutory limitation. Here, the underwriter relied on the terms of its insurance
coverage which happened to limit that coverage to the amount to which the
insured could limit his liability.
This observation caused the majority in Crown Zellerbach Corp. I1 to frame
the issue as follows:
Since there can be no question that Rule 8(i) is one of the ".
lawful conditions of the policy or contract," it brings us face to face
with the critical provision of the Louisiana Direct Action Statute that
"any action brought hereunder shall be subject to ... the defenses
which could be urged by the insurer to a direct action brought by the
insured .... 6s
Judge Brown explained that the policy limit at issue in Crown Zellerbach
Corp. 11 could not be contrary to Louisiana law or to the public policy of the
state. The supporting precedent was set forth in two Louisiana Supreme Court
decisions.' The result reached in Nebel Towing Co. could not, however, stand
in the face of that precedent:
The [direct action] statute does not purport to interfere with the right of
an insurance company to limit the so-called coverage, "in any policy
against liability," to "liability imposed upon him [the assured] by law,"
as this policy provides. An insurance company therefore, may-as the
company did in this instance-limit the coverage, or liability of the
company, to pay only such sums as the insured shall become obligated
to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law.
67
Judge Brown also saw no violation of public policy in the "wholesome
economic principle" that the underwriters pay up to, but not beyond, the
63. The policy limited the insurer's liability to "such sums as the assured... shall have become
legally liable to pay and shall have paid on account." Id. at 1299, 1986 A.M.C. at 1476.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1300, 1986 A.M.C. at 1478 (quoting the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, La. R.S.
22:655 (1977 & Supp. 1994)).
66. Burke v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 209 La. 495, 24 So. 2d 875 (1946); Ruiz v.
Clancy, 182 La. 935, 162 So. 734 (1935).
67. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1296, 1301, 1986 A.M.C. 1471,
1479-80 (5th Cir.) (quoting Ruiz v. Clancy, 182 La. 935, 941, 162 So. 734, 735 (1935)) (alteration
in original), cert. denied,'479 U.S. 821, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986).
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assured's legal liability. As Judge Brown put it, "Whatever the assured is liable
for, [the insurer] will pay, 100% in full with no discount, but no more. "68
Judge Brown also confronted Nebel Towing Co.'s personal defense theory.
He referred to the Alcoa Steamship Co. district court's detailed analysis, and
presumed the Nebel Towing Co. court must have been persuaded by that analysis.
The district judge in Alcoa Steamship Co. had concluded that a defense was
personal if the law granted it, as a matter of public policy, to all members of a
class. The district judge in Alcoa Steamship Co. also reasoned that limitation of
liability must be "personal" because it was granted to all shipowners. 9 The
Nebel Towing Co. court had adopted that analysis in its entirety.70
Judge Brown explained that some, but not all shipowners were allowed to
limit. If the defense were personal, each member of an "identified" class would
be allowed the defense. This distinction compelled the conclusion that limitation
of liability was not a defense personal to the shipowner.7 Indeed, if anything
were personal in character, Judge Brown wrote, the policy defense would be
personal to the underwriters.72
To be sure, there was a dissenting opinion, which asserted that insurance
policies had been sold and their rates determined on the basis of Nebel Towing
Co. While urging adherence to the Nebel Towing Co. holding that limitation of
liability is a personal defense," the dissenting opinion failed to explain why
courts should continue to do so.
Since Crown Zellerbach Corp. II, two cases involving the Louisiana direct
action statute and the Limitation Act have gone before the Fifth Circuit. One of
the two, Brister v. A.W.L, Inc.,7 4 was no more than an affirmation of Crown
Zellerbach Corp. II. The Brister court observed, as one might anticipate, that the
inclusion of so-called "Crown Zellerbach" clauses had become routine in marine
insurance policies.75
Most recently, In re Magnolia Marine Transport Co.7 6 was before the Fifth
Circuit. The underlying facts in Magnolia Marine Transport Co. were simple:
68. Id. at 1302, 1986 A.M.C. at 1480.
69. Alcoa S.S. Co. v. Charles Ferran & Co., 251 F. Supp. 823, 830-31, 1966 A.M.C. 1029, 1058-
60 (E.D. La. 1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 46, 1967 A.M.C. 2578 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
836, 89 S. Ct. 111 (1968).
70. Olympic Towing Corp. v. Nebel Towing Co., 419 F.2d 230, 237-38, 1969 A.M.C. 1571,
1581-82 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989, 90 S. Ct. 1120 (1970), overruled by Crown
Zellerbach Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 1296, 1986 A.M.C. 1471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 821, 107 S. Ct. 87 (1986).
71. Crown Zellerbach Corp. II, 783 F.2d at 1303, 1986 A.M.C. at 1482.
72. Id
73. Id. at 1305-06, 1986 A.M.C. at 1485-86 (Tate, J., dissenting). Judge Tate was joined by
Judges Rubin, Politz, Johnson, and Williams.
74. 946 F.2d 350 (5th Cir. 1991).
75. Id. at 359.
76. 964 F.2d 1571 (5th Cir. 1992). Magnolia Marine Transp. Co. reversed Magnolia Marine
Transp. Co. v. Frye, 755 F. Supp. 149, 1991 A.M.C. 1190 (E.D. La. 1991).
1995]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The master of one of two ships involved in a collision on the Mississippi River
drowned as a result of the collision. Procedurally, however, Magnolia Marine
Transport Co. was anything but simple. The widow of the drowned master sued
her late husband's employer and Mississippi Marine, the owner of the vessel her
late husband had commanded, in state court. She later joined Magnolia Marine,
the owner of the other colliding vessel, and Magnolia's marine insurance
underwriters. Magnolia petitioned to limit its liability in the federal district
court, and the limitation proceeding stayed the state court action. The widow
argued Magnolia's insurance contract, as worded, might not allow the insurers
to limit their liability. Persuaded by the argument, the district court stayed the
limitation proceeding to allow the state court to interpret the policy language.
Magnolia and its underwriters urged the federal court that it, rather than the state
court, should interpret the policy. They sought a declaratory judgment, and the
declaratory judgment suit in the federal district court was consolidated with the
limitation proceeding. Following the consolidation, the widow moved to dismiss
the declaratory judgment suit.77 The district court, relying on Crown Zellerbach
Corp. H, determined it should interpret the insurance policy because interpreta-
tion of insurance policy language was "more properly a function of the limitation
proceeding."78 The widow appealed.
Among the issues before the Fifth Circuit was whether the Limitation Act
afforded the underwriters of a shipowner a right of limitation. The court found
no such statutory basis.79 The court further found that a liability-term in a
marine insurance policy did not give the underwriters standing under the
Limitation Act to assert limitation defensively. 0 While noting that admiralty
jurisdiction encompasses issues arising from marine insurance contracts, the court
held federal courts had concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction over such matters
with state courts. The Fifth Circuit held interpretation of Louisiana marine
insurance contracts was a task for Louisiana's state courts.8 ' Magnolia Marine
Transport Co. read Crown Zellerbach Corp. 11 restrictively and determined the
insurer's right to limit its liability depends upon the terms of its contract of insur-
ance.
8 2
Since the Supreme Court's Jane Smith decision, the relationship between
limitation of liability and the direct action statute has continued to evolve.
Without guidance from Congress or Louisiana's legislature, however, courts have
had to devise solutions of their own.
The amount of compensation due injured parties in limitation situations
seems to have been left in the hands of the insurer. If the P&I insurer relies
only on the statutory right of its insured to limit, the injured parties will probably
77. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 755 F. Supp. at 151, 1991 A.M.C. at 1191-92.
78. Id., 1991 A.M.C. at 1193.
79. Magnolia Marine Transp. Co., 964 F.2d at 1576..
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1576-77.
82. Id. at 1576-77.
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have an unlimited amount of insurance available to them. If, on the other hand,
the P&I insurer limits the amount of its coverage to coincide with the dollar
value of its insured's limitation, the injured parties will only have that limited
fund to pay for their injuries.
This semantic resolution of the problem does not seem satisfactory. If the
Limitation Act causes a problem, it should be fixed rather than circumvented.
David Steel, Q.C., pointed to faults of the United States Limitation Act in a
paper he presented on September 27, 1994, in Cambridge, England. 3 Mr. Steel
observed that "the greater the maritime catastrophe, the smaller the fund under
current U.S. law." Thus, the greater the injuries, the less each victim will be
compensated.
It is obvious many judges simply do not like the Limitation Act and are
willing to use avenues such as direct action statutes to circumvent it. This
situation leaves neither the injured parties nor the shipowners with the predict-
ability they deserve. Trying a limitation action in the United States is quite a
gamble. The shipowners bear the burden of proving the cause of the catastrophe
and the lack of the owner's privity and knowledge of that cause. If successful,
a shipowner is liable only for the value of his ship at the end of the casualty
voyage plus the freight earned on that voyage and an additional fund for personal
injury and wrongful deaths of $420 for each gross registered ton. If a ship were
lost, the value of the ship would, of course, be zero. If the shipowner were not
able to limit, he and his underwriter would be liable without limitation.
The United States Congress would be well advised to change the Limitation
Act to take advantage of the finite but sizeable insurance available to pay injured
parties.85 On one hand, the United States should encourage investment in
shipping and the availability of insurance by limiting a shipowner's liability to
an amount he can insure for a reasonable cost. On the other hand, a reasonable
amount should be available to pay injured parties. Both considerations could be
met through a more certain limitation based on the tonnage of the ship plus,
perhaps, an additional fund for each person injured or killed by the vessel.
Ratification and possible amendment of the 1976 Limitation Conference8 6
could accomplish this purpose. The shipowner, her charterer, and others may
limit their liabilities pursuant to the 1976 Limitation Conference unless the
claimants bear the burdep to show that the persons attempting to limit intention-
ally caused the catastrophe or that they acted recklessly with actual, subjective
knowledge that the recklessness would probably cause damage. This limitation
83. David Steel, Q.C., Ships Are Different: The Case for Limitation of Liability, The David
Underwood Memorial Lecture (Sept. 27, 1994). The lecture was organized by the Cambridge
Academy of Transport and sponsored by the Swedish Club.
84. Id. at 2.
85. One needs only to look at the problems created by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2761 (Supp. V 1993), to realize insurance is finite.
86. See Official Records of the Int'l Conference on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims,
London, November 19, 1976.
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fund is based on the tonnage of the vessel, which does not decrease with the
severity of the catastrophe.
The United States should work with the international, maritime community
to establish a satisfactory limit and should ratify whatever result is reached by
these efforts.
